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I.

INTRODUCTION

Any understanding or review of the current juvenile court in
Minnesota must begin with a basic discussion of the manner in
which society has viewed children and families. More specifically,
in order to understand the “juvenile court philosophy,” it is critical
† Wright S. Walling is a 1972 graduate of the University of Minnesota Law
School. He is a founding member of the law firm of Walling, Berg & Debele, P.A.
He is the immediate Past President of the American Academy of Adoption
Attorneys and focuses his practice in all areas of juvenile and family law.
†† Stacia Walling Driver is a 2003 graduate of William Mitchell College of
Law. She is on the Board of Directors of Gift of Adoption Fund and is the co-chair
of the Hennepin County Bar Association Juvenile Law Section. Her practice
focuses on juvenile and family law issues.
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for the reader to be aware that juvenile court, and in particular,
juvenile court jurisdiction, includes a potpourri of issues dealing
with children and families which do not otherwise fit neatly within
the confines of other court processes. Children’s issues do not fit
well within the purview of the financially-oriented family court; nor
do they fit within the purview of probate court. Historically, no
processes or laws conveyed jurisdiction or authority to the court to
allow it to deal with and assist children suffering from abuse or
neglect, or children who committed acts which—if committed by
an adult—would be viewed as criminal.
Throughout the course of the last 100 years, society’s attitude,
as reflected in the “juvenile court philosophy,” shifted toward
rehabilitation assistance and away from punitive actions directed at
1
children. That philosophy is apparent now that the juvenile court
is responsible for a variety of juvenile and family issues such as:
disintegration of the family through termination of parental rights;
rehabilitation of families involved in neglect, dependency, and
Child in Need of Protection Services (CHIPS) cases; creation of
families through adoption and foster care placement; and financial
assistance to families through various programs like adoption
assistance and foster care payments directed at specific needs of
families and children.
Separation of criminal laws from laws controlling dependent
and neglected children was not particularly clear during the early
stages of the “juvenile court philosophy.” The result has been, in
some ways, a continuing struggle within the juvenile court itself to
deal with all aspects of family structure, creation, disintegration,
and assistance.
This Article looks at some of the historical developments that
have led to the current procedures and status of the juvenile courts
2
in Minnesota. In addition, it briefly reviews the development of
procedural due process within the juvenile court, and its impact on
the substantive issues that these courts are forced to deal with on a
3
day-to-day basis. Finally, this Article argues that the issues dealt
with by the juvenile court in Minnesota are some of the most
important dealt with by any court system and they deserve a
4
substantial influx of commitment, time, money, and expertise.
1.
2.
3.
4.

See infra Part II.
See infra Parts II-VI.
See infra Parts VII-VIII.
See infra Part IX.
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II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE
“JUVENILE COURT PHILOSOPHY”
It is easy to ignore the historical background of society’s view
of children and families when looking at the current situation in
juvenile court. Nonetheless, it is helpful to remember that the
current approaches to children and families developed over
hundreds of years preceding the formal creation of juvenile courts
5
and statutes in Minnesota and other states. As noted by French
historian Philip Aries in Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of
Family Life, significant trends in both medieval and early modern
Europe later filtered into American society and dramatically
affected how children were treated within the American court
6
system.
It is clear that in medieval times, the concepts of family and
7
childhood as we know them today did not actually exist. Rather,
during the Middle Ages, and for significant periods of time after
that, nothing in the behavior, activities, or other social involvement
8
of children distinguished them from adults. By the age of five,
children were expected to join adults in household chores, work in
9
family fields and shops, and participate in other adult activities.
Very few programs existed to assist troubled children or troubled
families, or to help children escape from either their own behavior
10
or the consequences of being abused or neglected.
During the late seventeenth century, as Christianity focused
more on living a moral and good life, an underlying transformation
began. This transformation included the notions that morality and
proper behavior had to be taught to children, and that abused
children should be removed from what might be viewed as the
11
corrupt world of adults. As a result, many middle class children
began to have more and more extended schooling, and this new
5. See generally PHILIPPE ARIÈS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY
FAMILY LIFE (Robert Baldick trans., 1962) (chronicling the concept of
childhood and the development of the family from the Middle Ages through the
twentieth century).
6. Id. at 9-11.
7. Id. at 128.
8. See id. at 50, 71.
9. Id. at 329.
10. See, e.g., Wright S. Walling & Gary A. Debele, Private CHIPS Petition in
Minnesota: The Historical and Contemporary Treatment of Children in Need of Protection or
Services, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 781, 783-84 (1994).
11. See ARIÈS, supra note 5, at 369.
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focus on educating children was accompanied by a heightened
12
Parents began to watch over their
interest in their well-being.
children rather than incorporate them into the work model of
13
assisting the family with its chores.
Parents began to promote
their children’s health and safety, and tried to prevent momentarily
14
abandoning them to the care of another family.
By the
eighteenth century, the child became the center of the middle class
15
family.
In this context, in early America, including colonial America,
the nuclear family eventually replaced the extended family as the
fundamental unit, enhancing the relationship between children
16
and parents. Children’s needs and futures became the focus of
17
family life.
Most families were initially tied to small communities, causing
family structure to become quite patriarchal; similar historical
18
trends can be seen throughout colonial America.
As with all
historical developments, the birth of children and subsequent
marriage of offspring were often driven by economic and social
19
conditions more than emotional factors. However, the distinctive
shift to the focus on children was remarkable. As a direct
outgrowth of this attitude, and particularly the background of
closely knit families and communities, the Puritans of colonial
Massachusetts enacted the first laws anywhere in the world to
20
address what they called “unnatural severity” to children. This
continued to reflect the family’s role as a primary unit in the social
21
control of the colony.
Officials were often quick to intervene when the welfare of
22
children seemed imperiled by the conduct of their parents. This
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 369-71.
Id. at 369.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 398-400.
Id. at 403.
PHILIP J. GREVEN, JR., FOUR GENERATIONS: POPULATION, LAND, AND FAMILY IN
COLONIAL ANDOVER, MASSACHUSETTS 73 (1970).
19. Id. at 74.
20. ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 4 (1987).
21. Id. at 17.
22. See JOHN DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT AND PERSONAL: THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE
COURSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 29 (1986). But see Mason P. Thomas Jr., Child Abuse
and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L.
REV. 293, 300 (1972) (noting that throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth
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often resulted in an attempt by governments to protect innocent
children and to punish parents, causing children to be separated
23
from their parents by institutionalization or apprenticeship.
Institutionalized children were often mixed with the homeless,
mentally ill, mentally retarded, and other persons deemed unable
24
to adequately care for themselves. Apprenticeships brought an
economic component to this philosophy by providing inexpensive
sources of labor in society, as well as a means for teaching children
25
skills for use as adults.
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these
attitudes began to shift. The impact of the westward expansion of
the colonies, and the increasingly diverse ethnic and religious
backgrounds of new immigrants, had a significant influence on the
attitudes of government and society in both secular and religious
practices, making attitudes more diverse and society less
26
homogeneous. The church began to play an increasingly smaller
27
role in “punishing” those viewed as moral offenders. At the same
time, however, the expansion of secularism and individual rights
tended to undermine the State’s authority to intervene in private
28
matters. The transformative social factors of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries gave rise to the so called
29
“republican family.” The family became smaller in size and more
30
of the family’s attention and resources focused on child rearing.
Society began to recognize the nurturing role families could
play by surrounding children with love and providing examples of
31
proper behavior and values. Expanding upon the philosophies of
John Locke, a growing humanitarian sentiment popularized the
32
idea of “Christian Nurture.” Nurturing, rather than hard work,
became not only the hallmark of the middle class childhood, but

centuries, courts rarely intervened against harsh discipline).
23. Thomas, supra note 22, at 299.
24. Id. at 301.
25. Id.
26. See PLECK, supra note 20, at 31-32.
27. Id. at 31.
28. Id. at 31-33.
29. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 4-9 (G. Edward White ed., 1985).
30. Id. at 6-8.
31. Id. at 111.
32. WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF
SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 111 (6th ed. 1999).
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33

also the sought after model.
Public interest in nurturing and
protecting children became the focal point during the last three
decades of the nineteenth century, a period of American history
34
known as the Progressive Era.
The Progressive Era saw the emergence of wealthy urban elite
who were “fearful of social disorder and dismayed by the poverty,
35
disease, and lawlessness of urban life.”
During the nineteenth
century, public interest focused on child abuse and neglect, as the
progressives of that time attempted to establish numerous
innovative institutions to address the needs of what they considered
36
“neglected, destitute, abandoned, and vagrant children.” By the
last quarter of the nineteenth century, organizations such as the
New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
(NYSPCC) attempted to respond to these conditions on behalf of
neglected and abused children and specifically sought to locate
37
and rescue them from their situations.
Eventually, the NYSPCC acquired specific police powers and
heavy influence over the removal of children from their parents’
38
control.
In fact, legislation authorized the NYSPCC to “file
complaints for the violation of any laws affecting children” and
“required law enforcement and court officials to aid agents of the
39
[NYSPCC] in the enforcement of these laws.”
They also
investigated and advised judges regarding the disposition and
placement of children who were poor, neglected, or involved in
40
delinquent acts.
During this period of time, the line between a child’s own
actions and his parents’ actions became blurred. Agents of private
societies were authorized to arrest “anyone found violating statutes
regarding children, or obstructing or interfering with the work of
41
the society’s [sic] agents.” Between 1875 and 1900, many cities
created similar cruelty prevention groups in an attempt to remove
children from the poverty and abuse seen as restricting their ability
33. Id. at 110-11.
34. Id.
35. PLECK, supra note 20, at 70.
36. Thomas, supra note 22, at 306.
37. Id. at 310.
38. Id. at 310-11.
39. Id. at 310. For statutory authority see 1881 N.Y. Laws 69-72, ch. 676, §
293, reprinted in 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 19395 (Robert H. Bremner ed., 1971).
40. Thomas, supra note 22, at 310.
41. PLECK, supra note 20, at 81.
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42

to become productive members of society in general. During this
time, progressives believed that “[b]y providing the child[ren] with
a healthy, moral, and secure home environment, adequate
schooling, and humane working conditions . . . a future American
society largely untroubled by vice, crime . . . poverty . . . [c]lass
antagonisms, ethnic divisions, and racial tensions would
43
[emerge].”
This world view prompted compulsory education
laws, new schools and vocational institutions, restructured
curricula, and restrictions on child labor. It also led to the
establishment of the federal Children’s Bureau and, of particular
significance, the creation of the first juvenile court in the United
44
States.
III. JUVENILE COURTS CREATED
The creation of the first juvenile court in Chicago, Illinois, in
1899 is viewed as a seminal development in the field of child
45
welfare.
Of significant importance is the potpourri of issues
within juvenile court jurisdiction.
Even at that time, both
neglected children and child offenders were subject to dispositions,
entrustment, and often committal to the same institution,
46
regardless of how they came to be before the court. This raised
significant questions regarding the constitutional validity of
juvenile proceedings, as did the general lack of procedure and due
47
process.
As the progressive view of family and children continued to
become focused, “[t]he juvenile court movement in the United
States gathered momentum in the final years of the nineteenth
48
century.” In April of 1899, Illinois passed the first juvenile court
42. See SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA 78 (1982) (explaining that proponents of institutions argued that
“in New York, Chicago, and other cities throughout the country, thousands of
children owed their livelihood and happiness to the educational and training
facilities of [institutions]”).
43. Id. at 7-8.
44. Id. at 8.
45. Thomas, supra note 22, at 323.
46. Id. at 315.
47. Id.; see infra Part IV. “The 1899 juvenile court law continued the blurring
of distinctions between neglected, dependent, and delinquent children and the
practice of mixing these children in the same institutions—sometimes under
repressive and punitive conditions.” Id. at 324.
48. MONRAD G. PAULSEN & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW AND
PROCEDURE 1 (N. Corinne Smith ed., 1974).
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49

act.
The act was spearheaded by reformers who were deeply
interested in a variety of social causes, including prison reform,
employment issues, women’s suffrage, and poverty law. The
passionate conviction of these reformers to protect children from
the disadvantages of a criminal conviction also propelled the
50
enactment of the juvenile court law.
Of additional significance, the new court was designed to
operate with great procedural informality—in the absence of a jury
trial, public trial, and constitutionally guaranteed rights of any
51
kind.
In particular, it was noted that charges were not filed
52
against a child but rather a petition was filed “in his interest.” The
original Illinois Act provided that “‘the court shall proceed to hear
53
and dispose of the case in a summary manner.’” The goal of the
court was to find out why a child had misbehaved and to offer
treatment to help him. As noted by one of the great early Illinois
judges, Julian Mack:
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has
this boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but What is
he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be
done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save
54
him from a downward career.
In 1927, Herbert Lou noted that “[t]he juvenile court is
55
conspicuously a response to the modern spirit of social justice.”
In many ways, a review of the current status of juvenile court
56
reflects a continuing commitment to the “spirit of social justice.”
While the issues of neglected, dependent, and abused children
remained high in the minds of the social reformers, statutes tended
to focus on dealing with children charged with committing acts
that would otherwise be criminal. The creators of the juvenile
court strongly believed that criminal statutes, which for hundreds
of years had essentially viewed children as adults by the age of
seven, were a total failure in deterring the criminal behavior of
49. Thomas, supra note 22, at 324.
50. Id.
51. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 2.
52. Id.
53. See id. (quoting 1899 Ill. Laws 131-37).
54. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909).
55. HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1927).
56. See id. (explaining that through the advent of juvenile courts “we have
now socially-minded judges, who hear and adjust cases according not to rigid rules
of law but to what the interests of society and the interests of the child or good
conscience demand”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/13

8

Walling and Driver: 100 Years of Juvenile Court in Minnesota—A Historical Overview an
03WALLING.DOC

2006]

4/5/2006 1:27:03 PM

100 YEARS OF JUVENILE COURT IN MINNESOTA

891

57

children.
Because crime was not suppressed, these reformers
58
believed that the criminal law actually operated to harm children.
59
“The conviction . . . stigmatized the child for life” and offered no
60
hope or opportunity for the child. A lengthy prison sentence, or
even capital punishment, given to a child older than seven years of
age had no deterrent effect, offered no assistance to the child, and
61
therefore was deemed repugnant. Even children who managed to
avoid imprisonment were failed by the system. In the early 1900s,
one commentator writing about delinquent children noted:
The significant fact which must not be overlooked is that,
even if [the child was] ‘let off’ by the justice or pardoned
by the mayor, no constructive work was done in the child’s
behalf . . . . [W]hatever was done in the case was
necessarily done with little or no relation to the child’s
62
history or surroundings.
Therefore, it was necessary to restructure all of the criminal
law in order to recognize that children themselves had no “free
will” and therefore were not responsible for their misbehavior—in
contrast to adults, who could in fact be rehabilitated through
63
treatment.
As attitudes toward “criminal” behavior changed, so did the
manner of dealing with children coming out of abusive, neglected,
and dependent situations. Initially there was a gray area in the
development of various jurisdictional bases including truancy,
64
All of these
incurability, and absenteeism from the home.
activities carried “criminal” penalties in delinquency proceedings,
65
although they constituted lawful activities for adults.
The rehabilitative model became the standard approach for
dealing with children. This approach responded to the failures of
66
criminal law and is reflected in the “juvenile court philosophy.”
Miriam Van Walters, a referee in the juvenile court in California in
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Julia C. Lathrop, Introduction to SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE & EDITH
ABBOTT, THE DELINQUENT CHILD AND THE HOME 4 (Richard C. Wade ed., 1970)
(1912).
63. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 2.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2.
66. Id. at 1.
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1923, noted, “the juvenile court is conceived in the spirit of the
67
clinic.” The founders of juvenile courts specifically believed that
“the behavioral sciences and the medical arts offered a body of
scientific information which, if applied to an erring child, could
68
work beneficial change in him.”
In both delinquency and child protection matters, the goal of
“[t]he court was to meet the child’s needs, to serve his best
69
interest[],” and rehabilitate him, rather than punish him.
Treatment was to be offered to meet the needs of the child and not
adjusted as a means of imposing punishment based on the
70
seriousness of the child’s act.
The probation officer or social
worker was at the heart of the entire juvenile justice system, acting
as a counselor to the child and providing consistent contact
71
between the court and the youth. The fundamental principle of
the juvenile court was that
[c]hildren are to be dealt with separately from adults.
Their cases are to be heard at a different time and,
preferably, in a different place; They are detained in
separate buildings, and, if institutional guidance is
necessary, they are to be committed to institutions for
children through its probation officers which the court
can keep in constant touch with the children who have
appeared before it. Taking children from their parents is,
when possible, to be avoided; on the other hand, parental
obligations are to be enforced. The procedure of the
court must be as informal as possible. Its purpose is not to
punish but to save. It is to deal with children not as
criminals but as persons in whose guidance and welfare of
the State is particularly interested. Save in the cases of
adults, its jurisdiction is equitable, not, criminal in
72
nature.
Further, juvenile courts integrate the science of human
behavior to address juvenile delinquency. On the topic of
integrating the science of human behavior into the juvenile court
67. Miriam Van Waters, The Socialization of Juvenile Court Procedure, in CRIME,
ABNORMAL MINDS, & THE LAW 158 (Ernest B. Hoag & Edward H. Williams eds., Da
Capo Press 1981) (1923).
68. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 2.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 3.
72. BERNARD FLEXNER & REUBEN OPPENHEIMER, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF THE
JUVENILE COURT 8 (1922).
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systems, Herbert Lou wrote:
It is perhaps the first legal tribunal where law and science,
especially the science of medicine and those sciences
which deal with human behavior, such as biology,
sociology, and psychology, work side by side. It recognizes
the fact that the law unaided is incompetent to decide
what is adequate treatment of delinquency and crime. It
undertakes to define and readjust social situations without
the sentiment of prejudice. Its approach to the problem
which the child presents is scientific, objective, and
dispassionate. The methods which it uses are those of
social case work, in which every child is studied and
73
treated as an individual.
Thus, the great social experiment of the juvenile court was
under way—examining the results and promoting the involvement
of the secular state within the lives of individual families—until the
development of healthy families and rehabilitation could be
achieved. It swept the country, and by the early 1900s, every state
74
in the union had passed some form of the juvenile court law.
From there, the spigot was opened to drop all aspects of children’s
lives into the unending sponge of juvenile court jurisdiction.
IV. PARENS PATRIAE TAKES ON DUE PROCESS
Almost immediately after the creation of juvenile courts,
concern arose over the paternalistic position of the courts, and the
limitations on what many viewed as constitutional requirements for
courts’ involvement in the lives of individuals. It is clear that the
founders of juvenile court were quite aware of the enormous power
75
of this court. The power of the court to interfere with children
and their parents, and in some cases to take children away and
76
place them in disciplinary institutions, was clear.
More
specifically:
The fact that the juvenile court exercised the power to
take children from their parents and to commit children
to state training schools by procedures that did not
involve a jury or a public trial, the right to remain silent,
the right to counsel and the rest, raised serious questions
73.
74.
75.
76.

LOU, supra note 55, at 2.
Thomas, supra note 22, at 327.
Id.
Id.
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of constitutional law. The power of the juvenile court to
operate in this informal fashion was almost universally
sustained in state courts by characterizing the proceedings
as civil rather than criminal—an exercise of parens patriae
77
power.
Many people characterized this power as punitive and
78
indistinguishable from criminal dispositions. However, the court
harkened back to early English law’s recognition of the residual
power of the crown to protect children and what was referred to
79
and continued to be referred to as the power of parens patriae.
The courts were unable to ignore these imperatives. Using this
power to protect children against the horrors of the criminal law,
juvenile court dispositions provided a basis for a “civil proceeding”
80
in which criminal sentences would be inapplicable.
Early cases invoked the doctrine of parens patriae as an effort to
“protect children” from their own misbehavior and from adult
wrongdoers. The court opinions appear reluctant to force the legal
analysis of juvenile courts into the framework of constitutional law,
thus prohibiting or avoiding application of constitutional principles
81
to these cases. As early as 1905, the Pennsylvania court stated:
To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from
continuing in a career of crime, to end in maturer [sic]
years in public punishment and disgrace, the Legislature
surely may provide for the salvation of such a child, if its
parents or guardian be unable or unwilling to do so, by
bringing it into one of the courts of the state without any
process at all, for the purpose of subjecting it to the state’s
guardianship and protection. . . .
[T]he act is not for the trial of a child charged with a
crime, but is mercifully to save it from such an ordeal,
with the prison or penitentiary in its wake, if the child’s
own good and the best interest of the state justify such
salvation. Whether the child deserves to be saved by the
state is no more a question for a jury than whether than
the father, if able to save it, ought to save it. . . . The act is
but an exercise by the state of its supreme power over the
welfare of children, a power under which it can take a
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
FLEXNER & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 72, at 8-9.
PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 5.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/13

12

Walling and Driver: 100 Years of Juvenile Court in Minnesota—A Historical Overview an
03WALLING.DOC

2006]

4/5/2006 1:27:03 PM

100 YEARS OF JUVENILE COURT IN MINNESOTA

895

child from its father and let it go where it will, without
committing it to any guardianship or any institution, if the
welfare of the child, taking its age into consideration, can
be thus best promoted. . . .
The design is not punishment, nor the restraint
imprisonment, any more than is the wholesome restraint
82
which a parent exercises over his child.
This sentiment was echoed by the Idaho Supreme Court in
1908:
[The juvenile court’s] object is to confer a benefit both
upon the child and the community in the way of
surrounding the child with better and more elevating
influences, and of educating and training him in the
direction of good citizenship and thereby saving him to
society and adding a good and useful citizen to the
community. . . . It would be carrying the protection of
“inalienable rights,” guaranteed by the Constitution, a
long ways [sic] to say that the guaranty extends to a free
and unlimited exercise of the whims, caprices, or
proclivities of either a child or its parents or guardians for
idleness, ignorance, crime, indigence, or any kindred
83
dispositions or inclinations.
This philosophy, or parens patriae, which led to significant
abuses, continued to be the order of the day in all aspects of
juvenile law for almost seventy years, from the passing of the 1899
84
Illinois statute until the Supreme Court decision in In re Gault.
Under the guise of the beneficent, the juvenile court judge sat at a
85
table or desk, rather than on a bench. From the table, the judge
dispensed justice to the needy children of society. This became the
norm, and was the basis for excluding essentially all constitutional
rights or other due process protections for the child, as well as the
family of a juvenile appearing before the court. For approximately
seventy-five percent of the existence of juvenile courts nationally,
and Minnesota courts as well, this model was used with the
overwhelming belief that it assisted both children and families.
However, in reality, it promoted uninhibited interference—albeit
oftentimes necessary intervention—in a child or family’s life, free
82.
83.
84.
text.
85.

Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200-01 (Pa. 1905).
Ex parte Sharp, 96 P. 563, 564-65 (Idaho 1908).
387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967); see also infra notes 152-69 and accompanying
See, e.g., Mack, supra note 54, at 120.
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from the perceived encumbrances of due process. Given such a
system, abuse could not be far behind.
V. THE EARLY MINNESOTA EXPERIENCE
The first Minnesota juvenile court statute, enacted in 1905,
reflected, as did most states, the social movements occurring at the
national level, as originally exemplified by the 1899 Illinois
86
statute. Early on, Minnesota began to address the needs of both
its “delinquent children and its dependent and neglected
87
children.”
The original juvenile court statutes reflected the same broad
and sweeping power found in other states at the turn of the
88
twentieth century.
Even prior to that, however, the Minnesota
courts had dealt with state involvement in family life, under earlier
statutes. As early as 1892, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in State ex
rel. Olson v. Brown, ruled on various 1878 statutes and amendments
89
thereto.
In Brown, an appeal of a lower court writ of habeas
corpus directed at the Superintendent State Reform School, the
Minnesota Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether a
90
child had been unlawfully restrained at the school. The case itself
involved relatively technical issues of jurisdiction and a charge of
“incorrigibly vicious conduct” where the child was “committed to
91
the guardianship of the board of managers of the reform school.”
In dealing with the jurisdictional issues, the court also indicated
that it was
obliged to consider the relator’s contention that the
legislation of this state, whereby justices are authorized
and empowered to commit infants to the care and
guardianship of the board of managers of the reform
school in consequence of incorrigibly vicious conduct,
and for a time exceeding three months, is not a valid
exercise of legislative power, under the constitution of this
92
state.
In specifically dealing with that question, the court noted:

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See TIFFIN, supra note 42, at 7-8.
1905 Minn. Laws 418.
Thomas, supra note 22, at 313-14.
50 Minn. 353, 357-59, 52 N.W. 935, 936 (1892).
Id. at 356, 52 N.W. at 935.
Id., 52 N.W. at 935.
Id. at 357, 52 N.W. at 936.
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The questions raised by the first of these propositions
have often been discussed by the judicial tribunals of this
country.
Legislation which, brushing aside and
disregarding the views, wishes, or supposed rights of
natural guardians, has had for its object the future welfare
of the minor children of incapable and unworthy parents,
or the care, custody, and proper training of incorrigible
and vicious youth by the state, has occasionally been
denounced with great vigor by the courts. A notable
example of this species of denunciation may be found in
the opinion in People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 281, written by Mr.
Justice Thornton. But legislation of this character has
been adopted in nearly all of the northern states, and its
validity has often been upheld. We do not propose to add
to the very many pages which, in the Reports and textbooks, have been devoted to the support of the position,
now taken almost universally by the courts, that a person
committed to the care and custody of a board in charge of an
institution of the character of the Minnesota state reform school is
not “punished,” nor is he “imprisoned,” in the ordinary meaning
of those words. Hence the constitutional provision which
regulates and limits the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in
93
criminal matters has no application.
More specifically, in quoting from the Wisconsin case of
94
Milwaukee Industrial School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, the
Brown court repeated:
And, in the first place, we cannot understand that the
detention of the child at one of these schools should be
considered as imprisonment, any more than its detention
in the poorhouse,—any more than the detention of any
child at any boarding school, standing, for the time, in
loco parentis to the child. Parental authority implies
restraint, not imprisonment. And every school must
necessarily exercise some measure of parental power of
restraint over children committed to it. And when the
state, as parens patriae, is compelled, by the misfortune of a
child, to assume for it parental duty, and to charge itself
with its nurture, it is compelled also to assume parental
authority over it. . . . And, in exercising a wholesome
parental restraint over the child, it can be properly said to
imprison the child no more than the tenderest parent exercising
93.
94.

Id., 52 N.W. at 936 (emphasis added).
40 Wis. 328, 337 (1876).
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like power of restraint over children. This seems too plain to
need authority; but the cases cited for the respondent and
95
others amply sustain our view.
Thus, even prior to the codification of the 1899 statute in
Illinois, Minnesota courts supported the ability of the justice of the
peace and the municipal courts to remove children from their
homes for active “incorrigibility” or other acts resulting from being
an abused, neglected, or dependent child.
Constitutional
objections were swiftly set aside and disregarded. Nevertheless, the
early statute did reflect some debate over whether it was the
responsibility of the State or the family to protect and punish
dependent and neglected children in particular. The 1905 statute
was designated as “an act as to regulate the treatment and control
96
One
of dependent, and neglected and delinquent children.”
commentator has noted:
While recognizing the authority and control of the state
through its courts, the 1905 statutes specifically allowed
any reputable person to file a petition alleging that a child
was neglected or dependent as long as that person resided
in the county and knew of the child who appeared to be
97
neglected or dependent.
Thus, the State recognized implicit gray areas when courts are
required to evaluate cases related to children, whether resulting
from abuse and neglect or from their own criminal or incorrigible
behavior.
Such protective statutes clearly drew on the courts’ long
history—extending back to the colonial era—of providing any
interested person in the community the ability to alert authorities
98
to family problems. The statutes allowed a combination of state
response and private action in dealing with families and their
children’s “best interest.” Again, however, the early stages of the
99
statutes provided few, if any, procedural protections for children.
Although early statutes recognized the relationship between the
court’s authority and the family’s responsibilities, provisions such as
95.
96.
97.

Brown, 50 Minn. at 358, 52 N.W. at 936 (emphasis added).
1905 Minn. Laws 418.
Walling & Debele, supra note 10, at 803; see also 1905 Minn. Laws 418, 419-

20.
98. See Walling & Debele, supra note 10, at 785-802 (providing a more
detailed historical discussion of the U.S. government’s approach to child
protection).
99. MINN. STAT. § 44 (1878).
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those allowing any “reputable person” to bring a matter before the
court highlighted the controversy over whether society or the
family was most responsible, and best fit, to address the needs of a
100
particular dependent or neglected child.
In 1912, Governor Burnquist appointed a twelve-person group
called the “Minnesota Child Welfare Commission” to recommend
revisions of all state laws, including the juvenile laws affecting
101
Other proposals included midwife regulation laws,
children.
educational scheme improvements, child labor law evaluation,
provisions for state guardianship of illegitimate children, and
paternity establishment laws to hold fathers responsible for their
102
children.
The commission also proposed some modifications of
103
the delinquency laws.
The jurisdictional basis for involvement of children in the
juvenile court continued to be amended and discussed. In 1913,
“habitual truant” appeared for the first time in the juvenile court
statutes, but only in the definition of the “delinquent” child and
104
not in the definition of “neglected” or dependent child.
Apparently, the law continued to be unable to distinguish between
a child’s actions and treatment for victimization of that child.
Significant change occurred during the 1917 legislative
session. An early law review article in this area, written by Judge
Edward F. Waite of the Hennepin County Juvenile Court, discussed
105
the imposition of these new laws.
Judge Waite stated that “[w]e
live in what has been aptly termed ‘the century of the child.’ Never
before have the obligations of society to its more helpless members
been so generally recognized; and of all forms of helplessness that
106
of childhood makes the strongest and most universal appeal.” In
addition, in listing what he viewed as impressive accomplishments
by the State of Minnesota in addressing these needs of children, he
included the creation of a reform school for young offenders,
schools for the deaf and blind, the juvenile courts in 1905, a state
100. See id.; 1905 Minn. Laws 418, 419-20; Thomas, supra note 22, at 315.
101. Edward F. Waite, New Laws for Minnesota Children, 1 MINN. L. REV. 48, 5152 (1917).
102. Id. at 53-56.
103. Id.
104. 1913 Minn. Laws 356, 357.
105. Waite, supra note 101, at 48 (discussing the importance in revising the
Minnesota laws concerning child welfare). Judge Waite was the chairman of the
Minnesota Child Welfare Commission, “appointed by the Governor to revise and
codify the laws of Minnesota relating to children.” Id. at 62 n.1.
106. Id. at 48.
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hospital for crippled children in 1907, and “mothers’ pensions” in
107
1913. These programs largely reflect the developments occurring
in other states during the Progressive Era.
Viewing the juvenile court from a modern social work
approach rather than an institutional approach, Judge Waite
clearly supported the Minnesota legislature’s effort to modernize
the State’s treatment of neglected, dependent, delinquent, and
abused children. Minnesota was clearly one of the most progressive
states, certainly in the vanguard of the reform trends of the early
108
1900s. Nevertheless, despite these high ideals and lofty goals, the
questions of due process and the right of the State and the courts
to intervene in the lives of children and families continue to be
raised in the court system.
In 1922, the Minnesota Supreme Court, once again dealing
with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, struggled with its view of
109
the constitutional issues.
In that case, fifteen-year-old Alice
Peterson was adjudged a “delinquent child” in the Hennepin
County Juvenile Court and committed to the County Home School
110
for Girls.
More specifically, she was charged with “willfully,
unlawfully, and wrongfully” refusing to attend school despite being
111
enrolled in the public school. Based on Ms. Peterson’s refusal to
112
As a result of
attend school, she was brought before the court.
her truancy disposition, she was detained at the County Home
School for Girls, and subsequently a writ of habeas corpus was
113
issued on the petition of the mother.
Based on previous case law and its application to “dependent
and neglected children,” the Appellant conceded that the act and
the ability to hold the child in such circumstances and for such
114
purposes was constitutional. However, the Appellant argued that
delinquent children are claimed to be in another class . . .
[and] when children commit crime the state cannot lay
hold of them, except by due process of law, as usually
administered by criminal courts under our Constitutions,
state and federal; for a child may no more than an adult
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 48-49.
See id. at 48.
Ex parte Peterson, 151 Minn. 467, 468, 187 N.W. 226, 226 (1922).
Id., 187 N.W. at 226.
Id., 187 N.W. at 226.
Id., 187 N.W. at 226.
Id., 187 N.W. at 226.
Id. at 469, 187 N.W. at 226.
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be deprived of liberty or punished for crime without a
115
trial in the ordinary way by jury.
In rejecting that argument, the court once again blurred the
lines between children being victims of abuse and neglect and
116
The court also blurred
being responsible for their own actions.
the line between what was “criminal law” in nature and what was
delinquent, which includes actions taken by the child which would
117
not be a crime if taken by an adult.
More specifically, the court
reasoned:
The principle is now rather firmly established that, for its
protection and the good of the child, the state may,
through its courts, place the child in charge of some
person or institution for proper training and support. It
matters little whether the danger to the child and society
comes because of the fault of others or that of the child.
The right of the state to step in and save the child is the
same. In that view the restraint put upon the child cannot
be regarded as punishment for crime . . . when it is
necessary for state to step in and perform the parental
duty the liberty of the child may circumscribed. In this
case the petition under which the juvenile court acted did not
charge Alice with a crime. Indeed, definition of delinquency in
118
the act includes matters other than crimes.
In reaffirming the law from earlier cases, the court stated that
“adjudging a child delinquent and committing it to the custody of a
state appointed guardian was not an imprisonment or punishment
119
for crime.”
Reflecting on its early decision, the court noted that
“the procedure which permitted a child to be committed to the reform school
without a jury trial was also held not repugnant to constitutional
120
guaranties.”
Once again reflecting the view of the statutes and the social
movement from the late 1900s, the court noted that the tenor of
the act indicates the sole purpose is the welfare of the delinquent
121
as well as a dependent or neglected child. That is, the treatment

115. Id., 187 N.W. at 226.
116. See id., 187 N.W. at 226.
117. Id., 187 N.W. at 226.
118. Id., 187 N.W. at 226. (emphasis added).
119. Id., 187 N.W. at 226-27.
120. Id., 187 N.W. at 227 (discussing State ex rel. Olson v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353,
52 N.W. 935 (1892) (emphasis added)).
121. Id. at 470, 187 N.W. at 227.
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122

is, and should be, essentially the same.
In supporting the broad
discretion of the juvenile court to deal with children as it saw fit,
the court concluded: “[w]e considered chapter 397, L.1917
designed to secure the welfare of delinquent children, and not to
punish them, and the restraint put on them to secure that end is
not imprisonment, but parental control by the state in cases where
123
parents have failed.” Thus, the parens patriae magnificent view of
the State, in contravention of all procedural and constitutional due
process, won the day. This philosophy of dealing with the
children’s “best interest” regardless of the reason that brought
them before the juvenile court continued essentially unabated and
unfettered for the next fifty years until the U.S. Supreme Court, in
reviewing the abuses of such a system, decided that perhaps
124
children should have some constitutional due process rights.
VI. THE CONSTITUTION AND DUE PROCESS REAR THEIR UGLY HEADS
IN CONTRAVENTION OF FULL UNFETTERED DISCRETION BY THE
JUVENILE COURT
A. Historical Application of Due Process Rights in Juvenile Court
As with other issues in society, it took many years for the
conflict between parens patriae and due process to percolate up to
125
In reviewing the timing on the
the U.S. Supreme Court.
significant changes that have impacted the juvenile court during
the most recent twenty-five percent of its existence, it is important
to note that, in the criminal law context, the Supreme Court did
not create or articulate many of the rights associated with due
process and limitation of government intervention in citizens’ lives
until the late 1960s. In particular, the first eight amendments to
the Constitution—including the portion of the Bill of Rights
reflecting criminal procedure requirements—were only applied
directly through the Fourteenth Amendment and due process to
126
The Supreme Court has
the states in 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio.
122. Id., 187 N.W. at 227.
123. Id., 187 N.W. at 227.
124. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). “Fit parents act in their
children’s best interests and there is normally no reason for the State to inject
itself into the private realm of the family to further question fit parents’ ability to
make the best decisions regarding their children.” Id.
125. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 4-5, 134.
126. 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961).
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applied the Fourteenth Amendment limitations on the power of
127
the states to the right against self-incrimination, the right to
128
129
130
counsel, the right to speedy trial, the right to public trial, the
131
right to confront opposing witnesses, compulsory process for
132
133
obtaining witnesses, the right to trial by jury, and the right to be
134
free from double jeopardy.
Thus, the application of these
otherwise basic constitutional rights in state proceedings and basic
criminal law was firmly established by the late 1960s. It is not
particularly unusual then, that the coming of due process in one
form or another to the juvenile court was delayed even further
beyond its application to adults.
Having decided that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires full application of due process to
state proceedings, the Supreme Court then began to turn to the
separate and otherwise independent juvenile court system.
For almost seventy years “young persons were adjudicated
delinquent, dependent, and neglected [during] informal
proceedings less protective of [their] individual rights than those
135
available to an adult criminal.”
Then, in 1966, the Supreme
Court reviewed the first of several juvenile court cases on the issue
136
In Kent, Morris Kent
of due process in Kent v. United States.
became involved in the juvenile court in the District of Columbia at
137
the young age of fourteen.
He was apprehended because of
138
While
several house breakings and attempted purse snatching.
on probation from earlier offenses, sixteen-year-old Kent was
charged with new allegations and, under the District of Columbia
statute, “waived” from the juvenile court jurisdiction into the adult
court jurisdiction, thus making possible an adult criminal trial and
139
criminal sentencing.
The judge, in accordance with the statute
and the approved practice in the district “held no hearing, made
127. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1964).
128. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).
129. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967).
130. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
131. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
132. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-18, 23 (1967).
133. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968).
134. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969).
135. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 12.
136. 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 546. Rather than ruling on the motions, the juvenile court judge
rendered an order declaring jurisdiction of the petitioner to be waived. Id.
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no findings and gave no reasons [whatsoever] for his action.” His
ruling was exclusively based on his personal estimate of Morris
Kent’s “amenability to treatment under the facilities” of the
141
juvenile court.
Waived from juvenile court, Kent was tried by a
jury and found not guilty by reason of insanity as to a rape charge,
142
but guilty on six counts of house breaking.
The Supreme Court
vacated the conviction based on the “waiver proceeding” in the
143
juvenile court.
In the first case of its kind involving a child, the Supreme
Court in Kent established a standard of due process, taken from the
144
Fourteenth Amendment, and applied it to juvenile proceedings.
As history has shown, and perhaps not surprisingly given the fact
that juvenile courts are and were by that point agencies of the
government, some juvenile court judges continued to argue that
145
due process had no place whatsoever in a court for children.
Kent settled the point and Mr. Justice Fortis speaking for the
Supreme Court stated, “[W]e . . . hold that the hearing must
146
measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.”
B. Due Process Rights and Requirements Begin to Assault the Historical
Juvenile Court Philosophy
During the next five or six years, the U.S. Supreme Court
began to take its most active role in juvenile court proceedings to
date. All measures of requests for applications of “due process”
rights to juvenile proceedings were brought before the courts, and
in general, the majority of “criminal rights” were also applied to
juvenile respondents in delinquency proceedings. While Kent was
technically an opinion regarding statutes in the District of
Columbia, there is little doubt that it was a predecessor and the
beginning of later endorsements of various due process rights
147
More specifically, in
including such things as a right to counsel.
support of later analysis, the Kent Court stated:

140. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 13.
141. Id.
142. Kent, 383 U.S. at 550.
143. Id. at 564-65. The Court remanded the case to the district court to
conduct a hearing de novo regarding the propriety of the waiver order. Id. at 565.
144. Id. at 557.
145. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 13.
146. Kent, 383 U.S. at 562.
147. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 13-14.
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In these circumstances, considering particularly that
decision as to waiver of jurisdiction and transfer of the
matter to the District Court was potentially as important to
petitioner as the difference between five years’
confinement and a death sentence, we conclude that, as a
condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner as entitled to
a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social
records and probation or similar reports which
presumably are considered by the court, and to a
statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court’s decision. We
believe that this result is required by the statute read in
the context of constitutional principles relating to due
148
process and the assistance of counsel.
Thus, Kent was based on an interpretation of statutes of the
District of Columbia and did not specifically rest on constitutional
grounds. It nonetheless provided a fresh breath of air on the due
process arguments leading to several subsequent decisions.
In 1967, the Supreme Court held that the fact finding or
adjudicatory hearing was to be measured by due process
149
In such cases, it held that those standards require
standards.
adequate, timely, written notice of the allegations against the
150
The Court also held that in all cases where
juvenile respondent.
juveniles were faced with the possible danger of loss of liberty
because of commitment, due process requires that the juvenile
151
have the right to counsel,
the privilege against self
152
incrimination,
and the right to confront and cross-examine
153
opposing witnesses under oath.
This particular case arose from an allegation in the juvenile
court in Arizona where neither Gerald Gault, then fifteen years old,
nor his mother were given adequate notice of the charge against
154
him. The charge was for allegedly making obscene phone calls to
155
a neighbor.
Neither the child nor his mother were informed of
his right to counsel, his privilege against self incrimination, or his
156
Nevertheless, Gerald Gault was
right to confrontation.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Kent, 383 U.S. at 557.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967).
Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 34, 42.
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adjudicated delinquent and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed
157
the appeal.
In reversing the Arizona conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court
reaffirmed its position with respect to due process as stated in
158
Kent. On the specific issue, as noted, the Gault opinion holds that
the respondent in the juvenile court and his parents are entitled to
written notice of the specific charge and the factual allegation to be
159
considered at the hearing.
Because the child’s adjudication as a
delinquent rested on an admission by him at the juvenile court
hearing and he was not advised of his right against self
160
incrimination, that he did not need to testify, or that he had a
161
162
right to counsel, the conviction was reversed.
In referring to
the Kent decision, the Gault Court stated that “the assistance of
counsel is essential for purposes of waiver proceedings, so we now
hold that it is equally essential for the determination of
delinquency, carrying with it the awesome prospect of
incarceration in a state institution until the juvenile reaches the age
163
of [twenty-one].”
With respect to self incrimination, the Court
stated that “[i]t would indeed be surprising if the privileging of selfincrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to
164
children.”
Despite the Gault decision, not everyone was in agreement. In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart noted that the Court had
invited a “long step backwards into the nineteenth century,”
165
denying that juvenile court proceedings were a criminal trial.
Further, there were in fact reasons why the elementary issue of
specific notice of a hearing was disregarded by the Arizona courts.
Justice Stewart further noted in his dissent that “a juvenile
proceeding’s whole purpose and mission is the very opposite of the
mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal court. The
object of one is a correction of a condition. The object of the
166
other is conviction and punishment for a criminal act.”

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 55-56.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 79-80 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 79.
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It was the opinion of many juvenile court judges at that time
that notice in advance of the proceeding would “serve to stigmatize
167
the child before trial.”
They believed that the notifying
document would “find its way into court records and may be read
168
The
by many persons, thus affecting the child’s reputation.”
motive of the judges was in fact a beneficent one with respect to the
children. However, the main point of Gault is that the stated
purpose to help and benefit or protect a child, while failing to
provide reasons for any decision, is not a basis to deny the
safeguards available to adult offenders.
The issues of the
stigmatization and resulting confidentiality of proceedings,
charges, and records, while beyond the scope of this Article, do in
fact raise significant constitutional, legal and ethical, and
procedural and philosophical issues, as society’s view of that issue
has changed dramatically in all aspects of juvenile court.
In reviewing the Gault and Kent decisions, it is important to
note that both of them signify great skepticism as to whether or not
the often restated juvenile court goals of rehabilitation and child
rescue were in fact close to or being realized in any situation. As
Paulsen and Whitebread have stated:
The Gault and Kent opinions both embrace the view that
the juvenile court’s aim of rehabilitative treatment has
fallen short of accomplishment either because resources
have not been made available to the court’s program or
because the goals of the juvenile court movement are
beyond the present ability of society to achieve. Gault and
Kent deny that important rehabilitative values are
169
undercut by requiring constitutional procedures.
Thus, instead of defining the issue as a conflict between due
process and parens patriae, the Gault and Kent courts, both opinions
written by Justice Fortis, state the position that both can exist
simultaneously to provide the best of both worlds on behalf of
children.
In expressing this general view and hope, Justice Fortis
nevertheless had strong words for the system. Specifically, he
stated, “[t]here is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for
concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
167.
168.
169.

PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 15.
Id.
Id. at 18.
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care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.”
In even stronger terms, in the Gault opinion Justice Fortis
speaks of the gulf between the State’s treatment of the adult and of
171
the child. He stated:
Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy
does not justify a kangaroo court. The traditional ideas of
Juvenile Court procedure, indeed, contemplated that time
would be available and care would be used to establish
precisely what the juvenile did and why he did it—was it a
prank of adolescence or a brutal act threatening serious
consequences to himself or society unless corrected?
Under traditional notions, one would assume that in a
case like that of Gerald Gault, where the juvenile appears
to have a home, a working mother and father, and an
older brother, the Juvenile Judge would have made a
careful inquiry and judgment as to the possibility that the
boy could be disciplined and dealt with at home, despite
his previous transgressions. Indeed, so far as appears in
the record before us, except for some conversation with
Gerald about his school work and his “wanting to go to . . .
Grand Canyon with his father,” the points to which the
judge directed his attention were little different from
those that would be involved in determining any charge of
violation of a penal statute. The essential difference
between Gerald’s case and a normal criminal case is that
safeguards available to adults were discarded in Gerald’s
case. The summary procedure as well as the long
commitment was possible because Gerald was [fifteen]
172
years of age instead of over [eighteen].
Also as noted, despite the efforts of the juvenile court to
eliminate the stigmatization effect of delinquency adjudications, in
173
Records of
most cases the stigma attaches in a serious way.
delinquency, when revealed to the government, the armed forces,
and sometimes even private employers, could seriously impact a
child’s future.
The Court in Gault discussed studies invalidating the
174
conception of the juvenile court judge as a wise father figure.
The studies demonstrated that the essentials of due process would
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
Gault, 387 U.S. at 29-30.
Id. at 28-29 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 25-26.
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contribute more to the realization of a therapy possibility than the
175
antiquated notion of a gentle judge with a parens patriae attitude.
As such studies surfaced, it became clear that due process should
be inserted into the juvenile court system.
After Gault, however, the court was not finished considering
the application of due process rights. In 1970, almost eighty years
after the first juvenile court statute in Illinois, the Supreme Court
held that in some delinquency proceedings juveniles, like adults,
176
were entitled to a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
As with the other cases, Winship was limited to the adjudicatory
stage of proceeding and did not expressly speak to the dispositional
177
stage.
It is unclear what types of cases were affected by the
decision. In addition, in limiting its application, Justice Brennan
expressly stated that “we intimate no view concerning the
constitutionality of the New York procedures governing children
178
‘in need of supervision.’”
Nevertheless, the application of Kent, Gault, and Winship
dramatically shifted the approach in juvenile proceedings and the
philosophical view of the courts that continued to place issues of
due process potentially in conflict with the parens patriae best
interests standard expressed by the early founders of the juvenile
court system. Despite the potential conflict, it was clear that the
Supreme Court held the view that the accommodation to
fundamentals and principals of due process would not stand in the
way of any legitimate goal of the courts to consider the children’s
179
best interests.
As a final matter, in 1971 the Supreme Court decided that
despite the previous decisions, juveniles were not necessarily
entitled to all constitutional rights assured adults, but that the
Court in Gault and Winship had “attempted to strike a judicious
180
balance.”
In McKeiver, the Court decided that a juvenile was not
181
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. The plurality’s opinion in
part rests on the concern that if jury trials were required in
delinquency proceedings, then such proceedings would be
175. Id.
176. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
177. Id. at 359.
178. Id. at 359 n.1.
179. Id. at 366-67.
180. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 234 A.2d 9, 15 (Pa. 1967)).
181. Id. at 545.
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182

indistinguishable from adult trials. In addition, Justice Blackmun
stated that a jury trial “will remake the juvenile proceeding into a
fully adversary process and will put an effective end to what has
been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective
183
proceeding.”
While recognizing that the juvenile court system
had its deficiencies and failures, the plurality did not believe a jury
trial would address any of these, nor that a jury trial would
184
necessarily lead to better fact finding.
The McKeiver opinion
reflects the Court’s ultimate unwillingness to throw out the
philosophical backbone of the juvenile court process and
demonstrates that there is much good to be found in the
traditional, informal proceedings.
Thus, nearly seventy years after its inception, the “juvenile
court philosophy” had undergone a revolution recognizing that in
some circumstances children are entitled to due process rights and
to some rights of their own, separate from the State and separate
from their parents. Later case law reaffirms many of these changes
and further clarifies what the philosophical shift entails, as noted
185
particularly in Minnesota.
The definitions of rights, procedures,
responsibilities and philosophy, however, are more clearly
implemented and reflected in the initial consideration and
development of procedural rules attempting to apply the
constitutional protections afforded by various cases.
VII. MINNESOTA DUE PROCESS—PROCEDURAL RULES COME TO THE
JUVENILE COURT
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Minnesota courts began
responding to the development of case law throughout the country
and, in particular, to U.S. Supreme Court decisions looking at
juvenile court procedures. This response included evaluating the
186
need for uniform procedures in delinquency cases. These initial
procedural rules attempted to balance the child-centered juvenile
court parens patriae view with the procedural due process
requirements and constitutionally imposed rights in an effort to
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 547.
185. See infra Part VII.
186. See, e.g., State v. Loyd, 297 Minn. 442, 449-52, 212 N.W.2d 671, 677-78
(1973) (harmonizing Minnesota statutory and case law regarding juvenile court
procedures with federal and state case law and an Arizona statute).
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continue the overall juvenile court philosophy in dealing with
187
The desire for judges to continue to be well versed in
children.
law as well as psychology, sociology, and child development was
considered throughout the development of procedural rules.
To understand the development of procedural rules and the
subsequent impact on procedural and substantive due process, it is
important to be aware that in the late 1960s the Minnesota juvenile
188
court structure was determined statutorily by individual counties.
At that time, district courts were deemed to be the higher level trial
courts, with municipal and county courts continuing to be viewed
as lower level trial courts. By statute in Hennepin and Ramsey
counties—the two counties in Minnesota with the largest
populations and the vast majority of juvenile delinquency cases—
189
the juvenile courts were a division of the district court.
Each of
these courts was effectively run and controlled by an individual
190
judge.
In each court, the judge had been the only juvenile court
191
These
judge presiding there for many years prior to that time.
judges suggested that the juvenile courts had specific procedural
192
rules that incorporated due process and equal protection rights.
Juvenile court judges in most other Minnesota counties, however,
played a far less specialized role because the probate court also
served as the juvenile court and may have had jurisdiction over
193
other minor offenses.
Interestingly enough, the statutes concerning the juvenile
court system gave no specific statutory authority to the judges to
194
create any specific rules applicable to juvenile court proceedings.
187. See, e.g., id. at 444-51, 212 N.W.2d at 674-77 (analyzing how to protect
constitutional rights when a juvenile confesses while in the juvenile court system
but may later be tried as an adult); Loyd v. Youth Conservation Comm’n, 287
Minn. 12, 17-19, 177 N.W.2d 555, 558-59 (1970) (explaining that a juvenile
adjudicated a delinquent is not entitled to the same procedural due process
standards as a juvenile convicted of a felony or gross misdemeanor).
188. MINN. STAT. § 260.021, subd. 1 (1965) (repealed 1978).
189. Id. § 260.021, subds. 2-3.
190. Id. Subdivisions 2 and 3 established special district court positions for
members of the bench in Ramsey, St. Louis, and Hennepin counties and required
these judges to devote themselves primarily to the juvenile court duties. Id.
191. Walling & Debele, supra note 10, at 817.
192. See generally id.
193. MINN. STAT. § 260.021, subd. 4. This particular juvenile court program
for smaller counties was originally established by law in 1961, and the 1965
amendment simply raised the minimum population. MINN. STAT. § 260.021, subd.
4 (1961).
194. See MINN. STAT. §§ 260.011-260.56 (1961).
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The probate court, on the other hand, did have such enabling
statutes, and in 1969 the Minnesota Probate Court Judges
Association, made up of all judges hearing juvenile court cases in
the eighty-five greater Minnesota counties, reviewed, drafted,
195
passed, and approved juvenile court procedural rules.
These
judges agreed to abide by the rules, known as the Rules of Procedure
196
for Juvenile Court Proceedings in Minnesota Probate-Juvenile Courts,
197
whenever exercising jurisdiction as juvenile court judges.
Nevertheless, judges in Hennepin and Ramsey counties failed
198
to approve or abide by these rules. There were many reasons for
this, including the fact that the metropolitan area saw a high
199
volume of juvenile cases.
These judges created their own set of
procedural rules for application within the Hennepin and Ramsey
200
county courts. The rules and versions of the juvenile court rules
of procedure for Hennepin and Ramsey counties were contained,
respectively, in the Hennepin County Minnesota Juvenile Court Bench
201
202
Book and the Ramsey County Juvenile Court Bench Book.
As a result of these two different approaches from 1969-1983,
the procedural rules applicable to juvenile court proceedings
varied from county to county and between the metropolitan area
and rural areas. The rights of juveniles or adults in dependency or
neglect proceedings were established by the county of the case’s
venue because the different procedural rights granted to juveniles
often had significant impact on primary substantive rights. The
critical issue, however, was that while these two sets of rules
purportedly were for procedural reasons, the reality is that they did
grant and/or interpret significant substantive rights. For example,
[T]he rules in Greater Minnesota specifically
delineated certain rights including the right to counsel,
the right to remain silent, and other basic rights. The
Hennepin and Ramsey County rules incorporated some
specific guarantees within other rules, but they did not
195. MINN. JUVENILE JUDGES ASS’N, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR JUVENILE COURT
PROCEEDINGS IN MINNESOTA PROBATE-JUVENILE COURTS (1969).
196. Id.
197. Id. at v.
198. See Walling & Debele, supra note 10, at 818.
199. Id.
200. See infra notes 204-05.
201. HENNEPIN COUNTY MINNESOTA JUVENILE COURT BENCH BOOK: DISTRICT
COURT—JUVENILE DIVISION (4th ed. 1977).
202. EDWARD J. CLEARY & KATHLEEN R. GEARIN, RAMSEY COUNTY JUVENILE COURT
BENCH BOOK (1982).
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contain a separate division for rights of the children.
Thus, substantive rights, such as right to counsel and the
right to remain silent, were much more explicitly spelled
out in the Greater Minnesota probate and juvenile court
rules.
At the same time, the Hennepin County rules
specifically addressed discovery issues. The procedural
rules used by the counties of Greater Minnesota did not
address discovery issues and did not interrelate with the
203
procedural rules from other courts.
Thus, for almost fifteen years the procedural rules, and
therefore the substantive rights of children and adults in
delinquency and neglect (now CHIPS) proceedings, were in fact
determined by the location within the state where the respondent
204
found himself.
Finally, in 1980 the Minnesota Legislature authorized the
creation of procedural rules that would apply to all juvenile court
205
proceedings within the state. Effectively, the Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted the first uniform rules of juvenile procedure for the
206
state in 1983.
These rules, though amended and delineated in
many ways, continue in one way or another to rule juvenile court
procedures to this day.
VIII. FINALLY UNIFORMITY AND A CONTINUAL BALANCING ACT
The committee that created the juvenile court rules divided
them into “delinquency rules” and “juvenile protection rules” to
207
emphasize the two separate objectives.
The latter set of rules
broadened the categories of protections to cases involving “all
dependency, neglect, neglected and in foster care, termination of
208
parental rights and review of out of home placement matters.”
This expansion marked the initial establishment of procedural
rules applicable to all juvenile court cases since the legislative
203.
204.

Walling & Debele, supra note 10, at 818-19 (citations omitted).
WRIGHT S. WALLING, THE JUVENILE COURT HANDBOOK: A PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE TO JUVENILE COURT PRACTICE IN MINNESOTA 1 (1984).
205. See MINN. STAT. § 480.0595 (1982) (requiring the Minnesota Supreme
Court to promulgate rules of procedure for the juvenile court); ROBERT SCOTT &
JOHN O. SONSTENG, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: JUVENILE LAW AND PRACTICE 12, at
ix (3d ed. 2002).
206. MINN. R. JUV. P.; see also SCOTT & SONSTENG, supra note 205, at ix.
207. SCOTT & SONSTENG, MINNESOTA supra note 205, 13, at 1.
208. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 37.01.
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creation of the terms “dependant” and “neglected” children nearly
209
eighty years before.
The framers of the new juvenile court rules created two set of
rules because they wanted to distinguish delinquency cases where,
because of the criminal nature of the delinquent acts, both the
procedural and substantive rights were critical from the juvenile
protection matters where other doctrines and philosophies come
210
into play.
In creating these categories, the framers struggled to
balance conflicting issues. On one side of the debate were the
constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and right to
counsel; on the other side was the philosophical concept based on
“juvenile court philosophy,” including the need for swift
proceedings responding to emergency situations and the
211
incorporation of long held notion of parens patriae. In struggling
to achieve the balance, the framers attempted to develop a system
which would reflect all of those things. In doing so, a procedural
system unlike any other within the court system of Minnesota was
created.
As an example of the sometimes subtle distinction
between the rules of civil and criminal procedure and the
rules of juvenile court procedure, rather than being a
party to an action, a person or entity has a “right to
participate.” Instead of applying the civil discovery rules
or the criminal discovery rules, a different set of rules
applying to pretrial discovery was created. At the same
time, in an effort to move matters along, time limits were
set within all of the rules to recognize that decisions in
212
children’s lives need to be made quickly.
Since the original 1983 statutes, Minnesota has enacted
numerous statutory and rule changes.
“Dependency” and
213
“Neglect” have been replaced by CHIPS; the rules themselves
214
have been amended; and the statutes have been amended to

209. See 1905 Minn. Laws 418 (defining the terms “dependent child” and
“neglected child”).
210. This distinction is illustrated by comparing MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 1-35
(involving matters where a minor child had violated state or local law) with Rules
37-65 (applying to matters not involving criminal juvenile misconduct).
211. Walling & Debele, supra note 10, at 820-21.
212. Id. at 821.
213. MINN. STAT. § 260C.007, subd. 6 (2004).
214. MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. (last amended July 11, 2005); MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P.
(last amended Jan. 1, 2004).
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215

reflect more openness and to make more matters public.
All
juvenile CHIPS proceedings and termination proceedings have,
unless otherwise ordered by the court, been deemed to be opened
216
to the public. All records in those proceedings other than those
217
sealed by the court have also been opened.
Further delineation has been taken and created in the rules
under the headings of the “Delinquency Proceedings” and the
“Juvenile Protection Matters”; and a substantial struggle has
continued in an attempt to define the amount of involvement that
the State should have in those “status offenses,” which are actions
deemed to be wrong by children but not deemed to be criminal by
adults.
The continuing tension between the rights of the
individuals involved, the theoretical view of parens patriae, and
action by the State, all continue to cause conflict, disagreement,
and discrepancy. At the same time, the Minnesota Supreme Court
continues to work with its appointed task forces on developing,
refining, and honing procedural rules to apply to all aspects of
juvenile court.
As recently as January 2005, Minnesota became the first state
in the country to have procedural rules which apply specifically to
218
adoption cases.
Although adoptions have been part of the
juvenile court milieu for many years, the connection and
interrelationship between other aspects of juvenile court and in
fact family court have not always been clear. This is particularly
true with respect to procedural rules.
The advent, however, of time limits and the development of
permanency placement requirements and options in the juvenile
court have further highlighted the reality that families and children
are difficult to place within a specific category of the court
219
system. The issues do not lend themselves to easy categorizing or
solutions. For example, the permanency option of permanent
215. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 260B.163, 260B.171, 260C.163, 260C.171.
216. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 8.04 (denying public access to the records except
for video or audio tapes describing neglect, reports of abuse or neglect, and HIV
test results).
217. Id. advisory committee cmt. (“Hearings or portions of hearings may be
closed by the presiding judge only in exceptional circumstances.”).
218. See MINN. R. ADOPTION P.; see also MINN. SUPREME COURT JUVENILE PROT.
RULES COMM., FINAL REPORT AND PROPOSED RULES OF ADOPTION PROCEDURE 3
(2004) (“[T]he Subcommittee contacted other states to solicit copies of their
Adoption Rules, but learned that no such rules exist.”)(on file with the William
Mitchell Law Review).
219. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.201 (2004).
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220

legal and physical custody to a relative bridged the jurisdiction of
family law statutes under Minnesota Statutes chapter 518 and of
221
adoption law statutes in Minnesota Statutes section 259.23.
These issues make it clear that delinquency cases, CHIPS cases, and
children’s best interests all transcend jurisdictional definition, such
as the distinction between family law and adoption law, and that
the interconnections between them are extremely important, and
still evolving.
As a result of the evolution of and importance of adoption law,
as well as the continuing interest in and litigation around various
adoption questions, Minnesota recognized the need for uniform
adoption rules. Hence the new adoption rules, which attempt to
222
define both what they apply to and when they apply.
Of note,
and for further discussion in other articles, is the fact that the
adoption rules take more of a civil discovery perspective than the
223
juvenile protection rules or the juvenile delinquency rules.
Exactly how all of these will be interpreted remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the
basis for decisions on responsibilities, charging, dispositions,
notice, right to counsel, etc., are all directly impacted and often
controlled by uniform procedural rules. The rights of respondents
in the juvenile court system have changed dramatically as a result.
Minnesota once again, as it did in the initial stages of the juvenile
court, is leading the way in the development of procedural rules
that impact substantive rights in all aspects of the jurisdictional
basis in juvenile court.
IX. CONCLUSION
Some one-hundred years after the first juvenile court statute
formally created the juvenile court jurisdiction in Minnesota, the
issues that surround society’s decisions on dealing with children,
families, and the creation and destruction of those families from
the legal perspective remain largely the same. While it took eighty
years to recognize that children should have certain constitutional
rights when they are being removed from the home, during the last
twenty-five years the courts and society have struggled just as
220. Id. § 260C.201, subd. 1.
221. Id. § 260C.101 (dealing with jurisdiction in juvenile matters).
222. MINN. R. ADOPTION P.
223. Compare MINN. R. ADOPTION P., with MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P., and MINN. R.
JUV. DEL. P.
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diligently to balance the rights of the individual with the needs of
families and children. It is impossible to overstate the impact of
the last twenty-five or thirty years on the philosophical issues raised
one-hundred or one-hundred-fifty years ago by the creators of the
“juvenile court philosophy.” The reality is that regardless of the
procedures applied, the substantive rights involved, or the power of
the State, the goal is and should continue to be to first define and
then implement what is in the individual “best interests” of the
child appearing before the juvenile court. While the procedures
have continued to evolve, so too has the juvenile court’s impact on
the individual child, family, and the whole of society. The goals of
the juvenile court remain vitally important and critical to society’s
view of dealing with its children.
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